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BETWEEN NATO AND UN
EU strategic culture and its approach to civil-military cooperation
Agata MAZURKIEWICZ
The  European  Union’s  approach  to  civil-military  cooperation  (CIMIC)  in  crisis  response
incorporates two different perspectives. The EU’s official concept is shaped after NATO’s military-
centred vision and is subordinated to the achievement of military goals. However, the application of
CIMIC in EU-led crisis response resembles the UN civilian-centred approach, aiming at supporting
civilian  environment  and protection  of  humanitarian  space.  This  article  discusses  this  complex
nature of the EU’s approach to CIMIC in the context of the Union’s strategic culture.
Abstrakt
Přístup Evropské unie k civilně-vojenské spolupráci v rámci řešení krizí zahrnuje dvě perspektivy.
Oficiální koncept EU je vystavěn na přístupu NATO, který je spíše vojensko-centrický a podřízený
dosahování vojenských cílů. Nicméně aplikace CIMIC během reakcí na krizové situace připomíná
civilní  přístup  OSN,  jenž  se  orientuje  na  podporu  civilního  prostředí  a  ochranu  humanitárního
prostoru.  Tento  článek  diskutuje  komplexní  povahu  přístupu  EU  k  CIMIC  v  kontextu  unijní
strategické kultury.
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Introduction
The  European  Union  has  proved  to  be  a  distinctive  actor  in  the  international  security  arena
combining civilian and military instruments. Initially a civilian power, focused on development and
humanitarian assistance, it now strives to wield a wide range of tools for crisis response, including
military  and policing.  [1]  Its  international  engagement  can  be  related  to  a  distinctive  strategic
culture,  here  understood  as  a  context  comprised  of  values,  ideas,  norms  and  tools  that
simultaneously influences and is influenced by strategic decisions and actions. [2] On the one hand,
the  Union’s  strategic  culture  is  founded  on  the  rejection  of  war,  the  emphasis  of  integration,
democracy  and  respect  for  human  rights.  [3]  It  rests  on  the  assumption  that  winning  and
maintaining  peace  requires  protection  of  individuals  and  a  comprehensive  effort  of  actors
administering diverse tools. On the other hand, the EU’s strategic culture validates declarations of a
robust and rapid military involvement. [4] In this unique context, the EU shapes its tools for crisis
response. Here, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) constitutes an interesting example of a tool that
brings  together  these  two  sides  of  the  EU’s  strategic  culture  –  humanitarian/development  and
military.  As  outlined  by  the  EU-CIMIC  concept,  CIMIC  is  a  military  function  facilitating
communication and coordination of actions between the military forces and civilians present and
active in the area of operation, e.g. local authorities, population or humanitarian and development
organisations. [5] 
The Union’s approach to CIMIC is complex. In the official  documents,  EU-CIMIC follows the
solutions proposed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and is therefore committed to
a  specific,  military-centred  perspective.  [6]  It  focuses  on  supporting  the  military  mission  and
increasing force protection by promoting a positive outlook on the armed forces. [7] However, the
application  of  EU-CIMIC in the  field  assumes a  different  perspective,  not  provided for  in  the
documents – resembling a civil-centred approach developed by the United Nations (UN). According
to this alternative perspective, civil-military cooperation is conducted in support of civilian actors,
in order to ensure the protection of humanitarian space and maximise civilian efforts. [8] In other
words, even though the EU is committed to NATO’s military-centred solutions in its official CIMIC
concept, the UN’s civil-centred perspective seems to be more prominent in the way it is applied in
the EU-led crisis response. Why did these two perspectives on CIMIC emerge in the EU’s approach
to civil-military cooperation? How can they coexist? And how do they relate to the core values and
concepts underlying the EU’s strategic culture?
The aim of this article is to discuss this complex nature of the EU’s approach to CIMIC in the
context of the Union’s strategic culture, which constitutes a space and rationale for the coexistence
and intertwining of military- and civilian-centred EU-CIMIC. The article investigates how NATO
and the UN’s perspectives on CIMIC intertwine in the Union’s approach and how they position the
EU-CIMIC in relation to the foundational elements of the Union’s strategic culture. This allows to
understand why and how these two approaches to civil-military cooperation exist in the EU-CIMIC
and discuss the possibility of strengthening its position in the EU crisis response. In order to reach
this aim, I firstly present the selected theory of strategic culture and look into the foundational
elements underlying the strategic culture of the EU. Next, I analyse and compare the UN’s and
NATO’s  approaches  towards  civil-military  cooperation,  thus  characterising  the  two  dominant
CIMIC  perspectives.  In  the  final  part  of  the  article  I  offer  a  discussion  on  how  these  two
perspectives on civil-military cooperation intertwine within the EU’s approach, how they relate to
the foundational elements of the Union’s strategic culture and how the EU strategic culture helps to
understand  this  mixture  within  the  EU-CIMIC.  The  article  ends  with  a  summary  of  the  main
findings and conclusions on the possibility of strengthening the position of EU-CIMIC within the
EU crisis response by more strongly aligning the orientation of the EU-CIMIC concept with the
core of the Union’s strategic culture.
EU strategic culture as a context
The father of the concept of strategic culture, Jack Snyder,  defines it  as a “sum total of ideas,
conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national
strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with
regard to nuclear strategy”. [9] His theory initiated what was later named the first generation of
literature on strategic culture, focused on policy differences “caused by unique variations in macro-
environmental  variables  such  as  deeply  rooted  historical  experience,  political  culture,  and
geography”. [10] This line of thought was later criticised, especially by representatives of the so-
called third generation, who highlighted “the interplay between strategic culture as an independent
and strategic decisions as a dependent variable, against a list of competing intervening variables”.
[11] In this article, I follow the line of thought of the first generation of strategic culture theories as
it allows the consideration of both the discourse and the characteristic practices of EU-led crisis
response as equally important sources of knowledge on strategic culture. After Gray, I treat strategic
culture  as  “comprising  the  persisting  (though not  eternal)  socially  transmitted  ideas,  attitudes,
traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a
particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical
experience.” [12] 
Strategic culture creates a context for the behaviour of strategic actors but it is also affected and
shaped by this behaviour. [13] It revolves around the core values and concepts or, as Longhurst puts
it, foundational elements, which “provide the deeper – basal – qualities, or fabric, of a strategic
culture  that  have  their  origins  in  the primordial  or  formative  phase of  development“. [14]  By
adopting this perspective, it is possible to analyse both the EU’s policy discourse on civil-military
cooperation,  as  well  as  its  application  in  the  field  and  juxtapose  them  with  the  foundational
elements  of  the  Union’s  strategic  culture.  Building  on  Pentland’s  assumptions,  I  expand  the
understanding of strategic culture “beyond military applications to broader realms of foreign and
security policy and embracing the instruments of soft power“. [15] In other words, for the purposes
of this  article,  the EU’s strategic culture is  viewed as a context,  specific to geographically and
historically  confined  security  community,  which  comprises  values,  ideas,  norms,  patterns  of
behaviour, and tools, including soft and hard power. It revolves around core values and concepts
which form a foundation for ideas, attitudes and modi operandi regarding the Union’s involvement
in  the  international  security  arena.  This  conceptualisation  allows  the  incorporation  of  both  the
documents regulating the EU-CIMIC, as well as EU-CIMIC practices, thus providing a context for
discussing the complex nature of the EU’s approach to civil-military cooperation.
Foundational elements of the EU’s strategic culture
The proposed definition of strategic culture is very broad, yet it allows to distinguish values and
concepts which constitute a very distinctive foundation for the EU’s strategic culture. Among them
are the common values inscribed in the treaties: “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” [16] which create a framework defining and
constraining the EU’s engagement in international security relations. [17] The EU’s strategic culture
has  a  distinctive  character.  Contrary  to  the  traditional  approach  in  which  strategic  culture  is
inseparably linked with the idea of war, the EU’s strategic culture is built on the “founding myth“ of
reconciliation and peaceful integration after the experiences of war and a consequent responsibility
for advancement of global efforts to build security. [18] In this sense, the EU “as a project for
peace, having risen from the ashes of two world wars” [19] initially constituted a “civilian power”,
exercising  its  influence  through  economic  strength,  diplomatic  cooperation  and  supranational
institutions.  [20] Following the EU’s inability to respond actively to the events in Rwanda and
former  Yugoslavia  in  the  1990s,  the  Union  started  to  develop  also  as  a  “military  power”,
introducing military capabilities and regulations on the use thereof.  Consequently,  the idea of a
“Military  Power  Europe“ became  one  of  the  narratives  underlying  the  EU’s  strategic  culture,
calling for the establishment of effective military capabilities in order to protect the Union’s security
and interests. [21] As noted in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security
Policy, “the idea that Europe is an exclusively ‘civilian power’ does not do justice to an evolving
reality” with numerous EU-led military operations [22] and a EU budget proposal set on 2 May
2018 suggesting a 22-fold increase in EU defence spending for 2021-2027. [23] While the EU’s
efforts to develop military capabilities are often deemed unsatisfactory, [24] it is nevertheless clear
that it displays certain military ambitions and strives to possess forces capable of an “early, rapid
and when necessary, robust intervention“. [25] This development of military capabilities did not
deprive the Union of its “civilian“ identity [26] and the blend of “civilian power“ and “military
ambitions“ is reflected within the EU’s strategic culture.
The literature discerns two other concepts which also comprise the foundation for the EU’s strategic
culture, namely human security and comprehensive approach. The concept of human security shifts
the attention from the state as the traditional object of security and instead rests on an assumption
that  security  should  revolve  around individual  “freedom from fear“ and  “freedom from want“.
Following Stępka, it can be understood as “a comprehensive set of conditions under which a human
being feels secure“. [27] Depending on a conceptualisation, threats to human security might have
solely a violent character or can include social, psychological, political and economic aspects of
vulnerability. [28] In any case, as elaborated in the report by the Study Group on Europe’s Security
Capabilities, “insecurity experienced by people living in places like the Middle East has a tendency
to spread, as September 11 dramatically illustrated“ and should therefore be properly addressed.
[29]  That  is  why protection  of  individual  human security  “provides  an enduring and dynamic
organizing frame for [the EU’s] security action“. [30] This dedication is reiterated across a variety
of EU documents such as the Global Strategy for the EFSP, the Reflection Paper on the Future of
European Defence or the European Union Maritime Security Strategy. [31] Thus, the responsibility
to protect individuals and their human rights constitutes a legitimate reason for the use of force by
the Union. In this way, the EU not only realises its moral and legal obligation but also addresses
problems that might eventually spill over and affect the security of EU citizens. [32] This view is
supported by Matlary for whom “a strategic culture for Europe must necessarily depend on notions
of human security and human rights more than on traditional territorial defence of nationals“.  [33]
Human security implies a need for a wider range of tools applied in order to address threats, as
compared  to  the  traditional,  military-based  protection  of  the  state.  In  this  sense,  this  notion
compliments the second concept underlying the EU’s strategic culture – comprehensive approach to
crisis response.
Comprehensive  approach  is  understood  as  harmonisation  and  integration  “across  the  security,
governance, development and political dimensions of international peace and stability operations“.
[34] This notion is deeply rooted in the EU’s strategic culture as it is linked with the fundamental
principle of coherence in the EU’s external actions, signalised as far back as the Maastricht Treaty.
[35] Comprehensive approach found its way into the European Security Strategy which declared the
EU “particularly  well  equipped to  respond to  (…) multi-faceted  situations“ which  cannot  “be
tackled by purely military means” [36] and was reiterated in the Global Strategy for the EFSP and
the Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence. [37] In other words, the EU possesses a
wide array of tools which can be used to stabilise the area of an operation,  including military,
economic and social instruments, but it is also open to cooperation with other actors involved in
crisis response, such as international, national and non-governmental organisations. As noted by
Norheim-Martinsen,  “the  idea  of  a  comprehensive  approach  to  security [fits]  well  into  the
conventional narrative of the European integration process as a project for peace by underlining
the military dimension’s secondary nature“. [38]
Building on this overview, it can be argued that human security, comprehensive approach, and the
blend of “civilian power“ with military ambitions, as well as such values as democracy, human
dignity and the rule of law, constitute the foundational elements of the EU’s strategic culture. They
influence the Union’s perception of, and preferable response to, crises, as well as its crisis response
tools,  such  as  civil-military  cooperation.  In  this  sense,  the  concepts  of  human  security  and
comprehensive approach seem to be underwriting the way the EU conducts its military activities.
They emphasise protection of human rights, post-conflict reconstruction and development aid, and
reflect such values as cooperation, local ownership and human rights. At the same time, the Union
strives to possess effective military capabilities which could be used to pursue its interests. In the
following sections I will look into the two dominant perceptions of CIMIC and the way they are
intertwined within the EU’s approach to civil-military cooperation in the context of the Union’s
strategic culture.
Approaches to Civil-Military Cooperation
NATO
NATO developed  a  unitary  concept  of  civil-military  cooperation  called  NATO CIMIC.  It  was
defined in 2001 as the „co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the
NATO Commander and civil actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as
international,  national  and  non-governmental  organisations  and  agencies“. [39]  In  this
understanding, NATO CIMIC is a military function performed in order to support the mandate of
the  military  commander.  This  characteristic  of  NATO  CIMIC  is  further  strengthened  by  the
conceptualisation of its main principles and functions. As such, the principle of mission primacy, set
first by the NATO CIMIC doctrine Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP-9) promulgated in 2003, was
explicitly and inexplicitly replicated by other documents regulating the conduct of civil-military
cooperation in NATO missions. [40] 
The AJP-9 defined three core functions of NATO CIMIC as: civil-military liaison, support to the
civilian environment and support to the force. [41] In this conceptualisation, two of the functions:
the first and the third, emphasise the subordination of NATO CIMIC to the military mission and
interest. Thus, civil-military liaison is conducted to facilitate and support the planning and conduct
of NATO operations, while support to the force includes minimisation of disruptions caused by
civilian  actors  to  military  activities,  securing  civilian  resources  (e.g.  local  personnel)  and
information, as well as raising acceptance of NATO’s activities among the local population. [42] In
the later version of the NATO CIMIC doctrine,  the AJP-3.4.9 signed in 2013, the order of the
functions  was  changed,  putting  the  support  for  the  force  to  second  place  and  thus  further
accentuating its importance over the function of support to the civilian entities. [43] The revised
doctrine of  NATO CIMIC stresses  the  proactive role  of  CIMIC in operations  planning and its
advisory function. These provisions make it clear that for NATO the civil-military coordination is
subordinate to the military goal. This is also a reflection of the mission structure as, contrary to UN
missions,  NATO military  operations  have  a  solely  military  command.  In  this  sense,  CIMIC is
utilised as a “force multiplier“ and a tool for “winning hearts and minds“ for the support of the
military commander. [44] 
United Nations
Contrary to NATO, the UN’s concept of civil-military cooperation is two-fold: one represents a
humanitarian  staff  function  (Civil-Military  Coordination,  UN-CMCoord)  [45]  and  the  other  a
military  function  (UN-CIMIC).  In  this  article  I  concentrate  on  UN-CIMIC  as  a  concept
corresponding to EU-CIMIC and NATO CIMIC. Its aim is to facilitate interactions between various
actors  present  in  the  mission  area  in  order  to  support  the  UN  mission  objectives  and  create
conditions that enable civilian organisations and partners to perform their tasks. [46] Its functions
are  “to  support  management  of  the  operational  and  tactical  interaction  between  military  and
civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operation; and (…) to support creating an enabling
environment  for  the  implementation  of  the  mission  mandate  by  maximizing  the  comparative
advantage of all actors operating in the mission area.” [47] 
Contrary to  the NATO understanding of CIMIC, the aim of UN-CIMIC is  to “create enabling
conditions for civilian organisations and partners”, [48] and thus to serve as a multiplier to civilian
efforts. The core tasks are civil-military liaison and information sharing, as well as civil assistance.
[49] There is no function which would provide support for the force, as it could be interpreted as an
abuse of humanitarian and development activities to serve military aims. [50] As UN missions are
led by civilian High Representatives of the Secretary General, it is not surprising that the UN’s
approach to civil-military cooperation is conducted in support of civilian goals. As observed by
Holshek, “UN-CIMIC stresses the primacy of civilian authority – working by, with, and through the
civilian  leadership.  Rested  on  international  legal  frameworks,  peacekeeping  principles,  and
international criteria on the use of force, UN-CIMIC is complementary to humanitarian assistance
and development.” [51] 
To sum up,  the  two approaches  represented  by  the  UN and  NATO differ  with  regard  to  their
civil/military orientation which can be easily differentiated by their definitions and core functions.
While  the  UN  is  focused  on  supporting  civilian  actors  in  carrying  out  their
humanitarian/reconstruction  tasks  and  preserving  the  humanitarian  space,  NATO  is  oriented
towards  gaining  support  for  the  military  activities  and de-confliction  between  the  military  and
civilian  spheres.  Where  the  UN  emphasises  the  primacy  of  civilian  authority,  the  Alliance
underlines  the  primacy  of  the  commander  and  his  mission.  In  this  sense,  the  UN and  NATO
represent two very different approaches to civil-military cooperation. [52] 
Discussion
EU-CIMIC In-Between
Keeping in mind the differences in perspectives on CIMIC developed by the UN and NATO, let us
now consider their influence on the EU’s approach, and the relationship of these two perspectives to
the foundational elements of the EU’s strategic culture. Similarly, as in the case of the UN, the EU
established  two  concepts  regulating  interactions  between  civilian  and  military  entities.  The
difference  lies  in  the  orientation  –  while  the  UN’s  division  revolves  around  humanitarian  and
military perspectives, the EU placed its concepts on an internal-external axis. The EU’s internal
approach to civil-military cooperation is named EU Civil-Military Coordination (EU CMCO); [53]
while EU-CIMIC refers to the external dimension of civil-military cooperation and is based on the
NATO doctrine. It is therefore a military function defined as “the co-ordination and co-operation,
in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations
and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as
international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.” [54] 
In this article I focus on the latter concept.
The  two main  documents  formulating  the  EU’s  CIMIC concept  are  not  based  on the  Union’s
experiences in peacekeeping, as they were drafted before the Union conducted its first operations.
Instead, they are modelled on NATO’s regulations. This decision could be explained by practical
and material reasons. The two organisations have shared most of their member states, along with
having  had  already  initiated  the  process  of  increasing  interoperability  between  their  military
capabilities.  The  so-called  Berlin  Plus  arrangements  have  enabled  the  exchange  of  classified
information  and  given  the  EU  access  to  NATO’s  military  planning  and  assets.  What  is  more
important  from  the  CIMIC  point  of  view,  Berlin  Plus  arrangements  have  also  obliged  both
organisations to “develop in a mutually reinforcing way and deliver the military capabilities they
need  for  crisis  management“. [55]  Consequently,  the  EU’s  official  concept  on  civil-military
cooperation  has  been  designed  in  a  way  that  allows  for  maximum  harmonisation  with  the
corresponding NATO doctrine. [56] 
Therefore,  the Union’s official  CIMIC concept  owes to  NATO its  distinctively military-centred
character. From the beginning, it has framed EU-CIMIC in terms of mission primacy and support to
the military commander. [57] It has not referred to humanitarian principles, nor the necessity to
respect (or protect) humanitarian space. Consequently, this approach has met with strong criticism
from the civilian environment, voicing that EU-CIMIC is in fact a synonym to the “hearts and
minds“ tactics. [58] Despite consultations with the civilian environment, [59] the 2008 revision of
the document has not done much to ease these fears. If anything, it has further strengthened the
militaristic undertone of the concept. When specifying the principles of CIMIC, the Union reiterates
NATO’s provision that “every effort should be made to secure and retain the willing cooperation of
civilian  organisations  with  which  the  allied  force  deals“. [60]  However,  the  official  Union’s
concept includes an additional caveat, which the NATO doctrine lacks, and which states: “Although
not  ultimately necessary,  every effort  should be made to secure the willing consent of  external
civilian organisations and local populations with which the EU military force is dealing.” [61] By
adding the clause “although not ultimately necessary“, the EU’s concept has further diminished the
“civilian“ part of the civil-military equation, showing that its consent is not truly relevant and thus
putting in question the benevolent undertone of the rest of the provision. Thus, the wording and the
content  of  the  EU’s  official  CIMIC concept  indicates  that  civil-military  cooperation  serves  the
military purpose.
Even though this military-centred perspective seems to be persistent in the concept and official texts
defining EU-CIMIC, its  practical  side reveals  its  second nature – emphasising support  towards
civilian activities, respect towards humanitarian principles and protection of humanitarian space. As
Gebhard observes, “an in-depth analysis shows that in line with its comprehensive approach to
security, EU-CIMIC clearly goes beyond traditional CIMIC conceptions in terms of their exclusive
focus on the military support function of CIMIC.” [62] In this vein, EU-CIMIC aligns more with
the UN’s approach to civil-military cooperation and is conducted to ensure “the mutual benefit of
both military and external civil actors“. [63] This reorientation might be linked to the fact that the
EU increasingly cooperates with the UN on a variety of policies and issues, including peacekeeping.
[64] As observed by Hummel and Pietz, “from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Mali and
the  Central  African Republic,  they  have  cooperated  in  the  field through various  activities  and
frameworks  and  in  an  increasingly  mutually  reinforcing  manner.” [65]  Examples  of  such
cooperation include the EU operations conducted under the UN mandate or as an answer to special
requests from the UN Secretary-General, the EUFOR Chad/CAR and the Operation Artemis acting
as  “bridging  missions“ for  UN operations  and  a  close  collaboration  between  the  EU and  UN
Department for Peacekeeping Operations in planning the EU mission in Mali. [66] This cooperation
propels the EU to shape its crisis response tools in a particular way. Indeed, the report of the 2007
consultations with EU member states mirrors the belief that the relationship between humanitarian
and military actors should be based on the principles included in the UN’s Guidelines on the Use of
Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the Guidelines on the Use of Military and
Civil Defence Assets in Complex Emergencies. [67] In this sense, EU member states declare their
commitment  to  respect  towards humanitarian principles  and humanitarian space,  as well  as  the
principle of separation of humanitarian activities from forces that are perceived as belligerents or
actively involved in combat. [68] These findings support the assumption that the Union conforms to
the UN’s vision of the standards guiding the civil-military relationship. Consequently, Metcalfe,
Haysom and Gordon infer from the report that “[the EU]  capacities must be deployed in a way
which complements and supports the work of humanitarian organizations.” [69] Also, an analysis
of the accounts of application of EU-CIMIC across various EU-led missions shows consistency in
the civilian-oriented way the civil-military cooperation is conducted, thus revealing a persistent,
characteristic pattern of behaviour diverging from the way prescribed in EU-CIMIC documents.
This observation is supported by an account of Major General David Leakey, the EUFOR Althea
Force Commander, who notes that one of the “key military tasks“ of EUFOR Althea was to support
the  civilian  efforts  in  the  areas  of  economy,  rule  of  law,  police,  and  defence  reform,  in  close
cooperation  with  other  civilian  actors.  [70]  EU-CIMIC  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  thus
supporting  local  authorities  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  local  ownership  and  peaceful
integration. The same approach to EU-CIMIC could also be observed during EUFOR Chad/CAR,
where EU-CIMIC activities were designed in a way to respect and protect the humanitarian space
while  supporting  the  Chadian  population.  As  described  by  Churruca,  the  EUFOR  Chad/CAR
personnel maintained regular dialogue with the humanitarian actors on the ground, consulting their
activities. [71] As a result, the military mission concentrated on the protection of individuals and
their rights, rather than on winning “hearts and minds“ of the population. [72] One of the most
recent  examples  of  this  behavioural  pattern  in  EU-led  military  missions  is  EUNAVFOR MED
Operation Sophia which has a CIMIC component liaising with civilian organisations with the goal
to help migrants. [73] Also in this case, EU-CIMIC seems to be following the paths of its UN
counterpart and working towards the aim of supporting the civilian environment through protection
of vulnerable individuals and fighting against human trafficking. This brief overview of the various
EU  operations  and  their  CIMIC  components  shows  that,  indeed,  EU-CIMIC’s  implementation
seems to diverge from its distinctively military-centred on-paper policy.  In practice,  EU-CIMIC
seems to be more sensitive to the needs and actions of the civilian environment and emphasises the
necessity  of  strengthening  local  ownership  and  human  security  as  well  as  the  protection  of
humanitarian space. In other words, the behavioural pattern of EU-CIMIC resembles the civilian-
centred approach presented by the UN.
EU-CIMIC and the EU’s Strategic Culture
It could be argued that the EU’s approach to CIMIC is paradoxical in its nature as it contains both
military- and civilian-centred perspectives on civil-military cooperation. The strongly militaristic
wording of the EU-CIMIC concept does not leave much space for a civilian-oriented CIMIC, yet its
application seems to indicate an inclination towards supporting the civilian environment. How can
these two dissonant perspectives coexist within a single organisation’s approach? The answer to this
question  can  be  partially  achieved through material  explanations.  The EU-CIMIC concept  was
designed during the initial  phase of development of the EU’s foreign and security policy when
harmonisation of policies and capability pooling and sharing with NATO were strongly emphasised.
The application of EU-CIMIC takes place under different circumstances, with the UN increasingly
acting as a key partner in the field. Yet, while these reasons allow to understand why both of these
approaches emerged, they do not explain why both of them are still maintained. Their coexistence
can  be  understood  when  we  consider  this  seemingly  inconsistent  mixture  of  EU-CIMIC
perspectives in the context of the EU’s strategic culture and its foundational elements. In this sense,
the EU’s strategic culture constitutes a space within which military- and civilian-centred approaches
to CIMIC intertwine. Based on this assumption, let us discuss how both CIMIC perspectives relate
to the foundational elements of the EU’s strategic culture.
The  decision  to  follow  NATO’s  example  in  the  official  concept  is  consistent  with  the  EU’s
pursuance  of  multilateralism  and,  to  some  extent,  comprehensiveness  in  crisis  response.
Harmonisation of policies with NATO allows for capability pooling and sharing and consequent
minimisation of working at cross purposes or duplication of efforts. This relates not only to the units
which perform CIMIC tasks during crisis response operations, but also institutions, such as the
NATO-accredited  CIMIC  Centre  of  Excellence,  which  can  provide  the  expertise  and  CIMIC
training to both organisations and is already conducting CIMIC seminars for the EU Battle Groups.
[74] The idea to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities by conducting CIMIC in support of the
military commander  is  also consistent  with the  Union’s  development  as  a  “military power“. It
reinforces the military capabilities of the EU’s crisis response and strives towards increasing its
effectiveness. In this sense,  it  emphasises the military ambitions of the Union as a capable and
effective security actor. However, this military-centred perspective on CIMIC seems to make it less
relevant  with  regard  to  the  other  foundational  elements  of  the  EU’s  strategic  culture.  By
emphasising  the  primacy  of  the  military  mission,  it  only  indirectly  supports  the  values  of
democracy, rule of law and equality. It does not contradict these values but advocates them as a by-
product of supporting the military force.  Furthermore, the military-centred CIMIC inadvertently
undermines the notion of human security and human dignity by treating civilians more as a means
to an end through the implied “hearts and minds“ tactics. In this sense, civil-military cooperation
focused on supporting the military, as inscribed in NATO’s and the EU’s official CIMIC concepts, is
not closely connected with all of the foundational elements of the Union’s strategic culture.
As already mentioned, the official EU-CIMIC concept does not substantiate the existence of the
civilian-centred aspects of EU-CIMIC as they are not inscribed into its provisions. The regulations
do  not  leave  much  space  for  the  focus  on  humanitarian  principles  and  the  protection  of
humanitarian space. However, this civilian-oriented side of EU-CIMIC is visible in the way the
Union conducts civil-military cooperation in the field. This might have its roots in the growing EU-
UN crisis response cooperation. However, a closer look at the compatibility of civilian-oriented
CIMIC with  the  foundational  elements  of  the  EU’s  strategic  culture  might  also  be  helpful  in
understanding why it is pursued. The civilian-centred CIMIC emphasises the fact that CFSP/CSDP
operations are a part of a broader effort and underlines the significance of non-military tools in EU-
led crisis response. In this way it reinforces the EU’s attachment to comprehensive approach. It also
underlines the importance of Europe as a “civilian power“ while at the same time does not belittle
its  military  ambitions.  Furthermore,  the  civilian-oriented  approach  to  civil-military  cooperation
seems to be more in line with the “founding myth“ of the EU’s strategic culture. It emphasises the
necessity  to  support  integration  and  reconstruction  after  war  –  tasks  most  often  conducted  by
civilian actors.  In  this  sense,  the UN-styled civil-military cooperation  serves  as  a  multiplier  of
civilian efforts aiming at improvement of local capacity and ownership rather than winning “hearts
and minds“. In accordance with the EU’s values of democracy and rule of law, it stresses the long-
term perspective  of  social  and  economic  development.  Finally,  the  concept  of  human  security
together with respect towards human dignity and human rights seem to be more attuned to the
civilian-centred approach to civil-military cooperation. Specialised humanitarian and development
organisations together with local authorities, rather than the armed forces, are usually considered
the most suitable actors to work towards the improvement of living conditions, raising awareness
about human rights, and strengthening civil society in the area of operation. By conducting CIMIC
in support of those civilian actors, the EU acts in a way more coherent with human security as one
of the foundational elements of its strategic culture. It could, therefore be argued that these two
factors – cooperation with the UN and the EU’s strategic culture – contributed to the development
and persistence of EU-CIMIC in a way unforeseen in the official documents.
Conclusions
As  shown  in  this  discussion,  the  nature  of  the  EU’s  approach  to  CIMIC  is  complex  as  it
encompasses  elements  of  two  different  perspectives  on  civil-military  cooperation  which  are
seemingly not compatible. The first one, represented by NATO and mimicked in the documents
establishing  the  EU-CIMIC concept,  underscores  the  primacy  of  the  military  mission  and  the
importance  of  supporting  the  force.  The second one,  introduced by the  UN and visible  in  the
application of EU-CIMIC in the field, is performed with an objective to create enabling conditions
for both civilian and military actors and to protect humanitarian space. The emergence of these two
perspectives within the EU’s approach to civil-military cooperation can be explained by material
reasons.  When  drafting  the  concept,  the  EU was  guided  by  the  principle  of  harmonisation  of
policies with NATO in accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements and the prospect of pooling
and sharing of  military capabilities  with the  Alliance.  However,  the  practice of  crisis  response
operations shows that the Union cooperates mainly with the UN. This, together with the similar
intensity of EU and UN-led operations, propelled EU-CIMIC into the UN-styled, civilian-oriented
CIMIC. What these material explanations fail to clarify is why these two perspectives still coexist
within the EU-CIMIC. Here, a closer look at the strategic culture of the Union helps to understand
this complex nature of the EU’s approach to civil-military cooperation.
Both of the perspectives on CIMIC are compatible with, and intertwine within, the EU’s strategic
culture. On the one hand, the military-centred perspective does, to a certain extent, support the
notion  of  comprehensive  approach,  as  it  allows  for  greater  interoperability  and  harmonisation
between the EU’s and NATO’s military engagements. It also strengthens the military ambitions of
the Union through the support of the military commander. On the other hand, the civilian-centred
CIMIC is also compatible with the concept of comprehensive approach, but it seems to enable the
accommodation of a broader array of efforts by reinforcing the achievement of civilian objectives
and  putting  greater  emphasis  on  the  protection  of  humanitarian  space.  At  the  same  time,  it
corresponds better with other foundational elements of the EU’s strategic culture:  it  emphasises
liberal values of democracy, development and peaceful integration; it strengthens the image of the
EU as a “civilian power“ and actively supports the notions of human security and respect for human
rights.  In  this  sense,  the  civilian-centred  perspective  on  civil-military  cooperation  seems  to  be
positioned closer to the core of the Union’s strategic culture.
This  division between the military-centred perspective promoted by the official  documents  and
civilian-centred  perspective  dominating  the  application  of  EU-CIMIC  in  the  field  hinders  the
position of EU-CIMIC within the Union’s crisis response. On the one hand, it is conducted in order
to increase the cooperation and coordination of the EU forces with other actors involved in crisis
response, rendering CIMIC an important function in light of the EU’s comprehensive approach. On
the other hand, the militaristic undertone of the official provisions might lead to a contradictory
effect and discourage other actors from engaging with the EU forces. With a unified approach to
civil-military cooperation, aligned with a larger number of the foundational elements of the strategic
culture,  the  EU-CIMIC could,  to  a  larger  extent,  facilitate  communication  and coordination  of
actions between various actors present in the area of an EU-led operation. From the organisational
point of view, this solution could be introduced if  the EU-led crisis response was placed under
civilian direction, similar as in the case of the UN’s missions. Subordinating the Union’s military
efforts to a civilian High Representative would change the balance of power within the EU-led
crisis response, but it might aid in eliminating the current stove-pipe type of command chain which
separates civilian and military efforts and highlight the core of the EU’s strategic culture. Without a
doubt,  this  proposal  would  require  further  discussion  within  the  constitutional  and institutional
scope of the EU. However, in this design, EU-CIMIC could play a more prominent role as a strong
link between various elements of crisis response. Instead of pursuing interoperability of capabilities
with NATO, the EU could develop its approach to civil-military cooperation in a way that is more
aligned with its strategic needs and consequently the core of its strategic culture.
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